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Within decisions, perceived alternatives compete until one is preferred. Across decisions, the playing field
on which these alternatives compete evolves to favor certain alternatives. Mouse cursor trajectories provide
rich continuous information related to such cognitive processes during decision making. In three
experiments, participants learned to choose symbols to earn points in a discrimination learning paradigm
and the cursor trajectories of their responses were recorded. Decisions between two choices that earned
equally high-point rewards exhibited far less competition than decisions between choices that earned
equally low-point rewards. Using positional coordinates in the trajectories, it was possible to infer a
potential field in which the choice locations occupied areas of minimal potential. These decision spaces
evolved through the experiments, as participants learned which options to choose. This visualisation
approach provides a potential framework for the analysis of local dynamics in decision-making that could
help mitigate both theoretical disputes and disparate empirical results.
C
hoosing between two or more available options is an activity extended in time, and during that time,
decisions evolve. The empirical literature on decisionmaking distinguishes between perceptual and value-
based decisions. Perceptual decisions (e.g., ‘‘Did I just smell coffee?’’) typically become more accurate the
longer they take, up to some threshold (for reviews, see1,2,3) and approximate optimality4,5,6. Value-based decisions
(e.g., ‘‘Would I like a cup of coffee?’’), in contrast, exhibit a number of well-known idiosyncrasies7–11. To date,
these effects have, in the main, been explained by theories concerned with the distribution of outcomes based on
utility12,13. Recently, however, there has been a shift towards the development of models, some informed by
perceptual choice models, that attempt to characterize processes occurring during decisionmaking14–24. Evidence
of these processes has been derived frompatterns of accuracy and response time, but there has been relatively little
research on the behavioral correlates of these processes. The current paper reports an investigation of sub-
decision dynamics and a new visualisation method to facilitate theoretical development in this area.
Important features of decision dynamics can be unveiled by tracking the motor execution that accompanies it.
Specifically, researchers have examined characteristics of response trajectories (the path from initiation of a
response to its completion) for decisions under varying conditions. Studies have employed a variety of response
equipment: the computer mouse25–31, the Nintendo Wii remote32,33 and a motion-tracking system fixed to digits
(34 see35–37 for reviews). For example, Dale et al.26 found that participants showed slower and longer response
trajectories when they had to choose between ‘‘MAMMAL’’ and ‘‘FISH’’ to categorize ‘‘sea lion’’ than to categorize
‘‘salmon’’ or ‘‘lion’’. In social categorization, participants take longer and show more divergent trajectories when
categorizing relatively androgynous faces (with ambiguous sex features) as ‘‘MALE’’ or ‘‘FEMALE,’’ than when
categorizing more typical male or female faces29. In these cases, categorizing more typical exemplars was easier
(faster andmore direct) than categorizing exemplars that were atypical ormore similar to the incorrect category, a
characteristic clearly observable from the response trajectories. These findings are not limited to categorization.
Spivey et al.25 demonstrated that phonological competition between available choices was observed in response
trajectories. When asked to ‘‘Click the Candle’’, participants’ responses were slower and less direct when required
to choose between a picture of a candle and a candy, thanwhen asked to choose between a picture of a candle and a
pickle.
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In line with some models of perceptual decision making, the fore-
going studies suggest that early in a decision, distributed neural
representations may be partially consistent with multiple out-
comes35,38,39. As time elapses, information accumulates until these
unstable patterns of neural activation dynamically evolve into more
stable patterns associated with one of the available outcomes.
Competition between outcomes increases the duration of the early
unstable phase during which multiple responses remain possible.
This gives rise to deflection in response trajectories from the shortest
direct path. For example, in a study of attitudes, Wojnowicz et al.39
found that participants responded with greater deflection when
responding in opposition to social stereotypes. In addition, in these
trials, velocity exhibited early instability followed by a compensatory
increase in velocity, which was predicted by a computational model
of decision making40,19. Indeed, the gradual accumulation of
information (sequential sampling) that may underlie the action
dynamics effect is a common feature of many current decision mak-
ing models41.
The foregoing literature suggests that great insights may be gained
by tracking decisions as they unfold. To date, researchers have inves-
tigated neural activity during decision making in an attempt to
characterize the evolution of perceptual42,43 and value-based44–46 deci-
sions, but few studies have investigated changes in behavior during
value-based decisions47,48,12. Koop and Johnson examined response
trajectories during a version of the Iowa Gambling Task and found
that response trajectories towards Good decks (rewards greater than
losses) gradually became more direct across blocks of decisions,
whereas response trajectories towards Bad decks (losses greater than
rewards) did not.
One way to conceptualize how we make decisions is to consider
the available outcomes as attractors in a decision space49,35. We make
a decision when our behavior reaches the vicinity of one of these
attractors. Killeen49 provided an account of conditioning as basic
physics within which he proposed that behavior could be under-
stood as movement in a behavior space in which incentives or
reinforcers lie at centers of basins of lowered potential. Responses
that are reinforced become more probable and faster over time as
the trajectories in behavior space are warped through contact with
these basins. In a similar vein, Spivey and Dale35 provided a model
of decision dynamics that proposed that response trajectories in a
binary choice may be understood as a path through a two-well
attractor landscape. This landscape, the decision space, is an
expression of the cognitive evaluation of the available outcomes in
a particular decision and the motor execution of the response influ-
enced by this evaluation. More recently, dynamic models of percep-
tual decision making inspired by neural models also emphasise the
role of attractor dynamics in decision making50,24,51. From this per-
spective, competing outcomes (i.e., valued choices) induce diver-
gent, slow, and longer action dynamics when those outcomes are
near equal in their potentiality.
In the experiments described here, participants played a simple
game to gain points, which constituted a forced-choice simple dis-
crimination task. In each experiment, some choices earned more
points than others and participants gradually learned which choices
earned them the most points. Each decision provided two choices
and, in themajority of decisions, one choice earnedmore points than
the other (High/Low, e.g., 20 points/5 points). In some decisions,
participants were required to decide between two choices that were
bothworth the same value, either a specific higher-point value (High/
High, e.g., 20 points/20 points) or a specific lower-point value (Low/
Low, e.g., 5 points/ 5 points). The relative reward in both of these
decision situations is 1, because the available choices in both cases
earn precisely the same number of points (20/20 5 5/5 5 1.0). In
light of the research summarized thus far, onemight expect that, with
equipotential response options, (a) there ought to be competition in
both situations, and (b) the degree of competition should be similar.
In actuality, the decision dynamics, both within and across decisions,
were markedly different in these two conditions.
Results
Across three experiments, the ratio of the high-point reward to the
low point reward was increased: Experiment 1 (7/5; n 5 34),
Experiment 2 (10/5; n 5 37) and Experiment 3 (20/5; n 5 55).
Learning was faster and more reliable as the high-point value
increased. On average, participants learned more quickly to choose
the higher of the two options in the 20/5 experiment than in the other
two experiments; after just 12 decisions, participants chose the high-
value symbol on over 80 percent of High/Low decisions. By halfway
through the experimental session (18 decisions), the high-value sym-
bol was chosen reliably in High/Low decisions in all three experi-
ments (see Fig. 1, bottom-left panel). The high-point value also
affected the proportion of participants who learned to consistently
choose the High options. The bottom-right panel of Fig. 1 provides
the distribution of high-point/low-point choice ratio across partici-
pants in each experiment. The log2 of the ratio of the probability of
choosing the high choice to the probability of choosing the low
choice on any High/Low decision (i.e., log2(pHigh/pLow)) is employed
as a measure of the degree to which the participant reliably chose
High options in High/Low decisions (in the literature on basic learn-
ing principles, the log2 ratio is employed as an index of relative
allocation of behavior to two independent responses and it has been
shown to be sensitive to relative magnitude of reinforcement52.
Figure 1 | Experimental task and learning data. The top panel provides a
schematic of the experimental procedure. The lower left panel depicts
mean probability of choosing a High option in a High/Low decision across
participants on consecutive blocks of 6 decisions in each of the three
experiments (error bars denote standard errors). The shaded area indicates
probability below 80%, the threshold used to infer that participants
learned to choose the High option, and the dashed line indicates 50%, the
choice probability expected by chance. The lower right panel is a bubble
plot of sensitivity to relative reward measured by the log2 probability of
choosing a High option. As relative reward increased (the horizontal axis),
more participants reliably chose the High choice in High/Low decisions.
The size of each point is determined by the number of participants that
obtained that value controlled for the number of participants in that
experiment (i.e., probability density of that value within each experiment).
The shaded area and black dashed line correspond to the same values as in
the left panel. The blue dashed line indicates the mean log2 probability at
each level of relative reward.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
SCIENTIFIC REPORTS | 3 : 2210 | DOI: 10.1038/srep02210 2
Mean log2(pHigh/pLow) increased as relative reward increased
across experiments. There was a weak but significant positive cor-
relation (r(126)5 0.22, p5 .012) between the log proportion ofHigh
to Low responses, log2(pHigh/pLow), and the log proportion of reward
magnitudes, log2(MHigh/MLow). We employed a series of binomial
linearmixed effectsmodels to further analyse this effect (see Table 1).
In line with the previous observation, the addition of Experiment as a
predictor improved the intercept-only model. In this model, accu-
racy was significantly lower in the 7/5 experiment than the 20/5
experiment, b 5 20.5800, z 5 22.589, p 5 .0096, and it was mar-
ginally significantly lower in the 10/5 experiment than the 20/5
experiment, b 5 20.4086, z 5 21.842, p 5 .0655. The model was
improved by adding the learning effect across decisions and log
transforming the effect of trials/decisions better fit the ceiling effect
on accuracy that can be seen in Fig. 1. In the final model, log(Trial)
was a strong significant predictor, b 5 1.1373, z 5 11.9905, p ,
.0001, but the interaction effect of Experiment and log(Trial) was
not significant. There no significant difference in the change in accu-
racy across trials between the 20/5 experiment and the 10/5 experi-
ment, b520.1454, z521.0232, p5 .3062, or between 20/5 and 7/
5, b 5 20.0666, z 5 20.4635, p 5 .6430.
Data selection for trajectory analysis. During decisions, the posi-
tional (pixel) coordinates of the response trajectories were recorded.
In line with previous work on action dynamics (e.g.25), we then
assumed a coordinate system in which the initiation of each deci-
sion trajectory constituted the origin. The horizontal (x) and vertical
(y) axes of the computer screen constituted the dimensions of this
‘decision space’.
In the analyses of the response characteristics, we filtered out
participants who did not appear to learn. Only participants who
chose the high-value symbol in High/Low decisions on 80% of the
last 12 decisions (n7/5 5 26, n10/5 5 26, n20/5 5 48) in each experi-
ment were included. These participants were deemed to have
demonstrated that they had learned the crucial distinction in the
experiment. The remaining participants were considered not to have
learned the High/Low distinction well enough for their responses to
be comparable to those who had. The greatest per-experiment pro-
portion of participants satisfied this response requirement in the 20/5
experiment (88%), followed by the 7/5 experiment (77%) and then
the 10/5 experiment (71%). The fact that a greater proportion of
participants reliably learned the distinction in the 7/5 experiment
than the 10/5 experiment was unexpected as overall learning (mean
pHigh) was better on average in the 10/5 experiment. In the following
analyses, we also excluded trajectories in which participants chose a
low-value symbol in a High/Low decision, as we considered such
decisions to be errors and errors are known to exhibit different
response characteristics (e.g., reaction times16) from expected or cor-
rect decisions.
Reaction time. Reaction time patterns were not affected by the
increase in relative reward across experiments. In the first 12
decisions, reaction times were relatively similar across decision
types. In High/Low and High/High decisions, reaction times
gradually decreased throughout the experiments, but, in Low/Low
decisions, reaction times remained consistently high. To examine the
effects of decision type on reaction times across trials, we fit a series of
linear mixed effects models, using maximum likelihood estimation
on log-transformed reaction times (see Table 2). There was no
significant effect of relative reward (Experiment) on log reaction
time. Reaction time decreased significantly across decisions, b 5
20.0087, t 5 214.98, p , .0001, but there was no main effect of
decision type. The change in reaction times across Low/Low
decisions was significantly different, b 5 0.0081, t 5 6.75, p ,
.0001, from the change across High/Low decisions, the change
across High/High decisions was not b 5 20.0004, t 5 20.38, p 5
.7063. That is, as can be seen in Fig. 2, exposure to the learning
context reduced the reaction times of High/Low and High/High
decisions, but not Low/Low decisions.
Maximum deviation. For each trajectory, we extracted how much a
trajectory deviated from the endpoint response option. This is an
additional measure of cognitive conflict: If a trajectory has high
maximum deviation, it means participants are moving their
computer mouse closer to the alternative response. With a lower
maximum deviation, it reflects a more direct movement towards
their choice (exhibiting less conflict, and more confidence).
Similarly to the reaction times, maximum deviation was relatively
similar across decision types in the first 12 decisions and then
decreased in High/Low and High/High decisions in the remaining
decisions. Maximum deviation during Low/Low decisions remained
consistently high throughout the experiment with a slight increasing
trend. To statistically investigate these patterns, we also used a series
of linear mixed effects models (see Table 3). Findings were similar to
those previously found for reaction times. There was no significant
effect of relative reward (Experiment) ormain effect of Decision type,
butmaximumdeviation decreased significantly across decisions, b5
20.7594, t5 23.26, p5 .0011. The change in maximum deviation
across Low/Low decisions was significantly different, b5 1.6263, t5
3.37, p 5 .0008, from the change across High/Low decisions, the
change across High/High decisions was not, b 5 0.1921, t 5 0.40,
p 5.6901. As participants progressed through the experiment, the
deflection towards the unchosen symbol decreased in High/Low and
and High/High decisions suggesting reduced conflict between
choices. This did not occur in Low/Low decisions, suggesting
Table 1 | Comparison of fits of binomial linear mixed effects models to predict High choices in High/Low decisions
Model No. Df AIC BIC logLik Chisq Chi Df Pr(.Chisq)
Intercept only 1 2 2757.19 2769.20 21376.60
Model 1 1 Expt 2 4 2754.05 2778.08 21373.03 7.14 2 0.0281
Model 1 1 Expt*Trial 3 7 2463.53 2505.58 21224.77 296.52 3 0.0000
Model 1 1 Expt* log(Trial) 4 7 2405.13 2447.18 21195.57 58.40 0 0.0000
Table 2 | Comparison of fits of linear mixed effects models used to predict log transformed reaction time
Model No. df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p-value
Intercept only 1 4 1283.34 1307.69 2637.67
Model 1 1 Decision 2 6 1158.34 1194.88 2573.17 1 vs 2 128.99 0.0000
Model 1 1 Decision * Trial 3 9 877.59 932.39 2429.79 2 vs 3 286.75 0.0000
Model 1 1 Decision * Trial * Expt 4 21 893.04 1020.91 2425.52 3 vs 4 8.55 0.7411
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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persistent conflict in these decisions throughout the experiment.
Results, by experiment, are displayed in Fig. 2.
Horizontal velocity.Within a decision, the available outcomes were
presented at the extreme left and right of the experimental display. As
a consequence, competition between the available outcomes may be
expressed in the horizontal component of response velocity (
dx tð Þ
dt
).
To further analyze the competition between outcomes, point to point
velocity in the x direction was calculated and then interpolated to 101
time steps to normalize response time and provide an average velo-
city profile in the last 18 decisions for each condition in all three
experiments (see upper panel of Fig. 3). In all three experiments,
horizontal velocity towards the eventual choice was slower to in-
crease in the Low/Low condition than in the other two conditions,
providing evidence of persistent early conflict during these decisions.
It is worth remembering that themean RT of Low/Low decisions was
significantly greater than High/Low or High/High decisions, so
the evolution of velocity seen in this figure underestimates the
differences in real time (Low/Low decisions took approximately
300 ms longer in real time on average). In binned segments of
trajectory (Fig. 3, lower panel), horizontal velocity during the third
quintile (40–60%) was significantly lower (p, .05) in Low/Low than
both High/Low and High/High in all three experiments. Otherwise,
the evolution of x velocity within decisions was quite similar for
equivalent conditions across the three experiments.
Response trajectory shape. If it is harder to make a given response
because participants are experiencing conflict, then the trajectories of
those responses should be more divergent: They should spend more
time between choices, and in some cases may even move towards the
alternative choice before making a response. We interpolated each
trajectory into 101 time steps so they could be overlaid into an
average plot (see25,26). Trajectories of decisions to the left-hand
choice were reflected in the vertical axis at the origin so that all
trajectories ended at the right-hand choice for ease of comparison.
The final 18 decisions were used because, by this point in all three
experiments, participants were choosing the high point choice on
80% of all High/Low decisions. This is shown separately for each
experiment in the lefthand column of Fig. 4. In all three experiments,
trajectories during Low/Low decisions were very different to those
observed in High/Low and High/High decisions. In decisions that
included a high-point choice, trajectories were relatively direct,
whereas trajectories in Low/Low decisions exhibited considerably
larger deflections towards the unchosen symbol. These deflections
suggest stronger and more persistent competition between the
available response options during Low/Low decisions.
The most conspicuous difference was between High/High and
Low/Low decisions, in which the relative magnitude of the points
available for each choice was the same. In a statistical comparison of x
coordinates (paired t tests) at each interpolated time step26, Low/Low
trajectories travelled significantly closer to the unchosen option than
High/Low trajectories for considerable portions of the trajectories (7/
5: steps 52 to 101; 10/5: steps 55 to 82; 20/5: steps 57 to 93) and closer
than High/High trajectories for similar portions (7/5: steps 41 to 90;
10/5: steps 55 to 75; 20/5: steps 50 to 94). In addition, in Experiments
1 (7/5) and 3 (20/5), small portions of the High/High decision tra-
jectories were significantly closer to the eventual choice that High/
Low trajectories (7/5: steps 29 to 53; 20/5: steps 44 to 52; departures of
less than 8 consecutive points were not considered significant to
preserve family-wise error-rate), offering some weak but significant
suggestion that High/High decisions may have been easier than
High/Low decisions. It is also worth noting that this facilitation of
High/High over High/Low was earlier in the trajectories than the
conflict effects observed in the Low/Low trajectories.
Modeling decision space. By connecting empirical action dynamics
with systems of differential equations, insightful new visualizations
of decision spaces are possible. We sought to characterize the cogni-
tive landscape from which decisions emerge. Using momentary
velocities and accelerations derived from the positional coordinates
in the decision trajectories, we inferred a potential field that captured
Figure 2 | Measures of choice conflict across blocks of 12 decisions. L/L denotes Low/Low, H/L denotes High/Low and H/H denotes High/High
decision types. (A) The top panel depicts themean reaction time and bootstrapped confidence intervals (calculated using the R package ggplot259) in each
block of 12 trials in each experiment. (B) The lower panel depicts the same values for maximum deviation, the furthest point in a trajectory from the
straight line from the initiation of a response to its completion.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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characteristics of this decision space. Low choices in High/Low
decisions were included in these analyses.
Using the computer-mouse coordinates collected during choices,
it was assumed that motion during a choice can be described by a
potential field given by the functionV(x, y)5Vx(x)1Vy(y), where x
and y are the screen coordinates. As a first approximate, it was
assumed that motion in the x-direction was independent of motion
in the y-direction, hence V(x, y) could be separated into the two
functions Vx(x) and Vy(y). Thus, the most simple system of sec-
ond-order ordinary differential equations describing the motion
could be written
d2x tð Þ
dt2
z
dx tð Þ
dt
z
dVx xð Þ
dx
~0, ð1Þ
d2y tð Þ
dt2
z
dy tð Þ
dt
z
dVy yð Þ
dy
~0: ð2Þ
The functions Vx(x) and Vy(y) were approximated using the
experimental data in two steps. First, the screen was discretized into
a mesh (x^, y^) and, using the mouse-cursor position data, approxima-
tions of the velocities (
dx^
dt
and
dy^
dt
) and accelerations (
d2x^
dt2
and
d2y^
dt2
)
were calculated at each mesh point by interpolation and averaging
over a chosen set of the participants’ motion data. Second, using eqs.
(1) and (2), the averaged velocities and accelerations were fed back
into the integrals
Vx xð Þ~{
ð
x
d2x^
dt2
x^ð Þz dx^
dt
x^ð Þdx^, ð3Þ
Vy yð Þ~{
ð
y
d2y^
dt2
y^ð Þz dy^
dt
y^ð Þdy^, ð4Þ
from which the overall potential function V(x, y) was calculated.
Note that this was done independently of the time when the mouse
cursor reached a specific position on the screen.
Across the three blocks of 12 choices in each experiment, the
induced decision spaces evolved to match the relative values of the
available choices. This is most clearly seen in the increase in potential
at the location of the low value choice in theHigh/Low decision space
(see Fig. 4, second column from left). For High/Low decisions, in
early decisions, these spaces showed relatively equal potential at the
location of low- and high-reward choices and across decisions, the
location of the high-reward choice decreased in potential and the
location of the low-reward choice increased in potential. Visually, the
decision space tipped towards the high-reward choice demonstrating
the facilitation of high-reward choices across decisions.
Further evidence of the change in dynamics across decisions is
observed in the gradients of the potential functions V(x, y) corres-
ponding to decision dynamics during the first and final block of 20/5
decisions (Fig. 5). On the high value side of the figure (right-hand
side), both early (red arrows; first block) and late (green arrows; third
block) point towards the stimulus on that side of the figure (i.e., 20).
Table 3 | Comparison of fits of linear mixed effects models used to predict maximum deviation
Model No. df AIC BIC logLik Test L.Ratio p-value
Intercept only 1 4 39931.56 39955.91 219961.78
Model 1 1 Decision 2 6 39870.32 39906.86 219929.16 1 vs 2 65.23 0.0000
Model 1 1 Decision * Trial 3 9 39859.73 39914.53 219920.87 2 vs 3 16.59 0.0008
Model 1 1 Decision * Trial * Expt 4 21 39872.18 40000.04 219915.09 3 vs 4 11.56 0.4817
Figure 3 | Mean horizontal velocity across 100 time steps in the final 18 response trajectories. (A) The top panel shows the evolution of horizontal
component of velocity towards the ultimate choice in the response trajectory. Velocities in the x direction were calculated between consecutive points in
each trajectory. (B) The velocity time series were interpolated into 100 time steps and then the mean velocity at each time step calculated to depict the
time-normalised evolution of velocity. The lower panel shows mean horizontal velocity and bootstrapped confidence intervals during consecutive
quintiles of 20 time steps.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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Figure 4 | Interpolated mean trajectories and decision spaces for blocks of 12 trials within each experiment. (A) The left column depicts the 20%
trimmed mean trajectories for the final 18 trials in each experiment. (B) Surface plots depict inferred potential fields based on momentary velocities and
accelerations derived from positional coordinates within response trajectories (see text for details). The positions of the circles depicted on the decision
spaces indicate the approximate starting point of trajectories (i.e., 0,0) and the colors of the circles denote the decision type.
Figure 5 | The gradients of the potential functions V(x, y) corresponding to decision dynamics during the first and third block of 20/5 decisions,
with arrows pointing ‘‘down hill’’, and where the high value stimulus is located on the right-hand side of the figure. The first block is highlighted with
red arrows and the third blck with green arrows. There is a marked change in the arrow directions on the left-hand side (low value side) between
the first and third block, indication of a positive bias towards the high value in the third block, where no such bias can be seen in the first block. Shaded
circles denote approximate locations of choice symbols.
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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However, there was a marked changed on the low value side of the
figure, as participants learned the values of the available choices. In
the first block (red arrows), motion towards the low value stimulus
was likely to persist; red vectors on the low value side of the figure
point toward the low value stimulus (i.e., 5). In contrast, in the final
block (green arrows), the vector of motion changed towards the
middle of screen indicating a reduction in the x component of velo-
city in the direction of the low value stimulus; green vectors on the
low value side of the figure no longer point toward the low value
stimulus.
The decision spaces also highlighted differences between High/
High and Low/Low decision dynamics. DuringHigh/High decisions,
stronger attraction (steeper slopes) indicated easier decisions (faster,
more direct) and potential at the choice locations was stable or
decreased across blocks indicating evolution of stronger attraction
towards high-point choices across decisions. In contrast, during
Low/Low decisions, weaker attraction (shallower slopes) towards
the available choices indicated greater persistence of indecision
(slower, less direct choices). The potential at 4 of the 6 low-point
choice locations increased across Low/Low blocks indicating weak-
ening of attraction to these choices. Finally, in the middle of the
decision space, the slope towards choices plateaued, providing tent-
ative evidence of a late ‘saddle point’ prior to eventual movement
towards the available choices. These decision space models provide
support for Killeen’s49 and Spivey and Dale’s35 position that a choice
between two alternatives can be understood as movement in a two-
well attractor landscape.
Discussion
Across three experiments, participants were sensitive to the relative
reward for outcomes in a binary decision task. As the ratio of the
higher reward to the lower increased across experiments, partici-
pants were more likely to reliably choose the outcomes with the
higher rewards. Within experiments, for those who learned to reli-
ably choose the high reward outcomes, the evolution of preference
within and across decisions was similar across experiments. When
one outcome was more favorable than the other (High/Low), deci-
sions were fast and direct. When both outcomes earned equal
rewards, decision dynamics depended upon the value of the available
rewards. If both choices earned high rewards (High/High), the deci-
sions were fast and direct, like High/Low decisions. If both choices
earned low rewards (Low/Low), decisions were slow and indirect,
with persistent early instability. Potential surfaces derived from posi-
tional coordinates fit with theoretical characterizations of decision
making (e.g,49,35,24) in which available choices are attractors in a
decision space.
To date, preferential decisionmaking has, in the main, been inves-
tigated by analyzing patterns of choice allocation and response times.
Our analyses of decision dynamics potentially provide much greater
detail on the evolution of decisions. In the current experiments,
reaction times were sensitive to the greater competition during
Low/Low decisions. However, when we controlled for reaction time
(Fig. 3), the evolution of horizontal velocity towards the available
choices remained markedly different across conditions. Low/Low
decisions were not simply slower versions of High/Low and High/
High decisions; they exhibited a distinct temporal evolution charac-
terized by persistent early competition that was not observed in the
other decisions.
Low/Low decisions induced greater competition than High/High
decisions. If one considers that the rewards available for choices
determined the attraction towards the available choices, then one
might expect persistent competition between two strong attractors
in High/High decisions. Instead, participants chose one of the avail-
able high value options quickly and directly. Greater competition
between similar low value choices than similar high value choices
has been seen in some recent experimental data and in basal ganglia
and diffusion models of decision conflict53. We can see two possible
explanations for these differences in the current study. The first is
that participants may have set a reference point based on some func-
tion of the mean points per decision10,19,13. Since low value symbols
were below this reference point, they may have been experienced as a
loss and aversive, even though they remained nominally rewarding.
Research on framing effects17 provides convincing evidence that
repulsion from perceived bad choices (loss aversion) is a powerful
determinant of eventual choice. In this case, in addition to attraction
towards the available choices, low value choices may have exerted a
repulsion on response trajectories, in effect a dynamic expression of
approach-avoidance conflict54. In High/High decisions, there would
have been no repulsion to counter the attraction towards the eventual
choice resulting in faster more direct trajectories. A weakness with
this account is that repulsion from Low value options would encour-
age faster and more direct choices in High/Low decisions than in
High/High decisions, whichwas not observed (in fact there was some
evidence of the reverse effect). Within a binary choice framework, it
is difficult to distinguish attraction towards the terminal choice from
repulsion from alternative choices, but analyses of decision dynamics
provide a fresh approach to distinguishing between these different
possibilities.
An alternative explanation of greater competition during Low/
Low decisions is that the slower uncommitted responding in Low/
Low choices was due to a negative incentive contrast effect. A nega-
tive incentive contrast effect occurs when following experience with a
high value reward, the incentive effect of a low value reward is
reduced. For instance, animals are known to run slower and less
directly towards a less preferred reward following training with a
preferred reward (see55 for a review). The fact that responding to
High/High and High/Low decisions exhibited similar characteristics
suggests that the highest available stimulus on a trial dominated
decision dynamics. Further research under tighter laboratory con-
trols will facilitate more thorough investigation of these findings
including testing the stability, in longer protocols, of the differences
identified herein. In particular, the seeming absence of conflict dur-
ing High/High decisions relative to High/Low decisions invites fur-
ther empirical research. In an attractor model, Low/Low decisions
might be understood to constitute a decision space with two weak
attractors that fail to capture response trajectories until later in the
decision. In High/High and High/Low decisions, stronger attractors
captured response trajectories earlier and pulled trajectories faster
towards completion.
As mentioned previously, some dynamical models of decision-
making predict greater competition between similar low value
choices than between similar high value choices. In particular, basal
ganglia and diffusion models predict these effects, but so, arguably,
do models that include lateral inhibition, when inhibition is
high4,19,21. Indeed, the very low conflict observed during High/High
decisions might constitute evidence of strong inhibition of the High
alternative in these cases. The foregoingmodels constitute a subset of
sequential-sampling models of decision making, in which informa-
tion gradually accrues over time to bias the eventual choice. The
current method of collecting detailed movement data on decisions
seems particularly appropriate for the analysis of such models, since
they propose processes that unfold over time and eventually arrive at
one of the available options. Dynamic competition between graded
continuous representations of choices may account for gradual shifts
in trajectory and ‘changes of mind’ (e.g.24). Finally, a number of these
models demonstrate attractor dynamics, which may allow research-
ers to developmodel decision spaces to compare with decision spaces
generated from experimental data.
Within a broader learning context, Scho¨ner and Kelso56,57 pro-
posed a dynamical account of learning as the integration of intrinsic
dynamics and behavioural information. In our experiments, intrinsic
dynamics refer to the attractor landscape in the space of possible
www.nature.com/scientificreports
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responses (including physical, biological and learned constraints)
prior to exposure to a new decision and behavioural information
both mitigates the expression of those dynamics in that decision
and updates the intrinsic dynamics for future decisions. Average
decision spaces, such as those generated in the current analyses,
characterise the gradual evolution of preference in different subsets
of environmental contingencies. In this way, we approximate the
average change in the intrinsic dynamics of preference and the aver-
age impact of behavioural information. Metaphorically, the decision
space is the ‘playing field’ on which decisions compete. However,
Scho¨ner and Kelso emphasise that the greatest contribution of their
account is to enable modelling of intrinsic dynamics at the individual
level. In contrast, our average decision spaces necessarily occluded
inter-individual differences in learning and, thus, differences in the
structure of decision spaces at the level of the individual participant
(with his/her particular physical, biological and learning con-
straints). At present, many trajectories are required to establish stable
decision spaces and, thus, it was not possible to compare decision
spaces at the level of the individual participant or trajectory. As we
learn more about the expression of decisions in two-dimensional
space, then it might be possible to generate decision spaces for indi-
vidual participants or decisions. For instance, one might hypothesise
a baseline space (e.g., for a condition or an individual), from which a
specific trajectory might provide deviations that would allow us to
generate an hypothetical decision space for that trajectory. It is our
hope that analyses of decision dynamics and the depiction of deci-
sion spaces will provide a flexible testbed for future theoretical
development.
Methods
Participants were drawn from Amazon Mechanical Turk (mturk.com), restricted to
the United States, with the following inclusion criteria. Participants were required to
have completed a minimum of 100 Mechanical Turk tasks prior to participation and
they were required to have an approval rate 95% or above (i.e., in 95% of cases they
were paid for the work they had done), a measure of how effectively they typically
dealt with Mechanical Turk tasks. Participation in the experiments earned US$0.50.
At the beginning of each participant’s performance, they answered a series of
demographic questions (which could be filled in before, or after, but not during, their
performance). This included simple non-identifying information such as age and first
language. From Amazon, participants were forwarded to an external link that pre-
sented a ‘‘game-like’’ interface using Adobe FlashH.
At the beginning of the experiment, the following instructions were presented:
Thank you for your work on this brief HIT.
In the next screen, youwill see a small green button. Click it to begin the first round.
There are 36 rounds and in each round you will choose between two shapes to earn
points. Different shapes give different points. The more points you earn the better!
Are you ready?
Click the bottom-right corner of this instruction box to continue…
On each decision, participants clicked on a button at the center of the bottom of the
screen to begin their response, which was made to one of two shapes from the Bodoni
font set presented on the top-left or top-right of the computer screen. This produced,
on each decision, a computer mouse-cursor trajectory from the bottom center to the
left or to the right (see Fig. 1).
Across three experiments, the ratio of the high-value choice to the low-value choice
was systematicallymanipulated. Participants were assigned to either Experiment 1 (7/
5; n5 34), the high-point reward was 7, and the lowwas 5, in Experiment 2 (10/5; n5
37), high was 10 and low was 5, and in Experiment 3 (20/5; n5 55), high was 20 and
low was 5. To control for any potential effect of the Bodoni font, at the start of each
experiment, two shapes were randomly (across participants) assigned to the experi-
ment-specific high value, and the two others to the low value (these stimulus-reward
pairings remained consistent within each participant’s set of decisions, so that they
could learn these values). In each decision, two of the four symbols (High 1, High 2,
Low 1 and Low 2) were presented as choices, creating three possible choice situations:
a high-value choice versus high value choice (High/High), a high-value choice versus
low-value choice (High/Low), and a low-value choice versus low-value choice (Low/
Low). The Flash game presented 36 of these decisions in a random sequence, 24 in the
High/Low condition, and 6 in each of High/High and Low/Low conditions. On
clicking a choice, the points for that choice were presented in green text (e.g.,120) in
the middle of the screen and a point counter in black text at the top of the screen was
incremented by that value (see Fig. 1).
Amazon Mechanical Turk provides access to a demographically diverse popu-
lation58. However, though arguably providing increased ecological validity, the online
environment is relatively uncontrolled compared to typical decision-making
experimental contexts. We employed a number of exclusion criteria designed to
exclude participants who did not pay due attention to the experimental task. From a
total of 140 participants, participants who satisfied the following criteria were
excluded: those whose mean reaction time was below 500 ms (n 5 9), those with a
reaction time on any trial of greater than 10 s (n 5 6), those who completed fewer
than 36 trials (n 5 5) and those who chose the left or right stimulus on over 75% of
trials (n 5 2). Overall, 11 participants were excluded (8%). Following these exclu-
sions, trajectories of the remaining 129 participants were visually analysed and three
further participants were removed because of unusual patterns (e.g., ‘‘swooping’’,
moving directly left or right before moving upwards towards the choices). 126 par-
ticipants were assigned to the three experiments as described above.
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